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This paper uses a panel of manufacturing firms to analyze the adjustment process in capital, blue collar 
and white collar employment in Uruguay during a period of trade liberalization when average tariff 
protection fell from 43 to 14 percent. Desired factor levels arising from a counterfactual profit 
maximization in the absence of adjustment costs are calculated, generating a measure of factor shortages 
or surpluses. The average estimated output gap for 1982-1995 is 2%. Our policy analysis shows that 
trade openness affected the adjustment functions of all three factors of production. Highly protected 
sectors adjust less when creating jobs (reducing labor shortages) than sectors with low protection. This 
may be due to fears of policy reversal in highly protected sectors. Also, highly protected sectors adjust 
more easily (than low protection sectors) when destroying jobs (reducing labor surpluses), especially in 
the case of blue collar labor. This suggests that trade protection may in fact destroy rather than create 
jobs within industries, as firms in highly protected sectors are more reluctant to hire and more ready to 
fire than firms in sectors with low protection. The results for capital are qualitatively similar but 
quantitatively smaller, suggesting that trade protection plays less of a role in explaining adjustment costs 
for capital. Interestingly, export-oriented sectors have lower adjustment costs for blue collar labor, but 
not for white collar employment or capital, suggesting that export-led growth may be successful in 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The traditional microeconomic textbook model assumes that the level of employment and capital 
used by firms is optimal at any point in time. But since adjusting employment and capital is 
costly to firms, they often deviate from what would be optimal in the absence of frictions. 
Understanding the way firms react to employment and capital shortages can shed light on many 
issues of microeconomic and macroeconomic nature. In this paper we analyze such adjustment 
process, based on a panel of manufacturing establishments in Uruguay. 
 
The Uruguayan economy evolved from inward looking, based on state interventionism and 
import substitution protectionist policies, towards an outward looking orientation, with more 
reliance on markets as resource allocation mechanisms and exports as the growth engine. A first 
phase of trade reform took place in the 1970s, accompanied by a quick financial liberalization 
process. Later, trade liberalization was deepened in the 1990s, combining a gradual unilateral 
tariff reduction with the creation of Mercosur, an imperfect customs union between Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.  
 
A by-product of the trade liberalization process in Uruguay was that manufacturing firms 
switched to more capital intensive technologies. Specifically, in the 1990s, there were high job 
destruction rates as reported in Casacuberta, Fachola and Gandelman (2004). We focus on the 
adjustment process, and our main concern is with the effect of protection levels and trade 
liberalization on the adjustment functions for capital and white and blue collar employment. 
 
The objectives of the paper are: i) to present an estimation of the adjustment functions for labor 
(blue and white collar) and capital, ii) to study the differences in the adjustment process for each 
factor of production and iii) to analyze the impact on these adjustment functions of tariff barriers, 
trade liberalization and international exposure.  
 
Our main results confirm the lumpy and discontinuous nature of firms’ adjustment process. 
Large shortages of one factor lead to less responsiveness in adjustment in the creation side of 
other factors but larger adjustment in the destruction side. Adjustment costs reduce the volatility 
of factor usage but on average they implied an annual gap between desired and observed output 
of 2%. Less protected sectors adjust a larger fraction of the gap in the creation side but a lower 
fraction in the destruction side.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the policy experiments and the basic 
definitions of factor growth rates, factor shortages and adjustment functions. Shortages are 
defined with respect to some targeted desired levels. Section 3 details the methodology to obtain 
these desired levels. Readers not interested in the technicalities of this procedure may skip this 
section. Section 4 presents the results and analyzes the effects of policy changes in the 
adjustment process of firms and finally section 5 concludes.  
 
   3
2.  Labor and capital adjustment functions 
 
In the traditional model without adjustment costs, the employment (capital) choice of the firms 
depends only on current shocks and future expectations. In the presence of adjustment costs, it 
also depends on past employment (capital) decisions and in the gap between the actual level of 
employment (capital) and the “desired” level. We will use the notation B*, W* and K* and B, W 
and  K for the desired and actual levels of blue collar labor, white collar labor and capital 
respectively. A key step in the present methodology is the construction of this “desired” level.  
 
The growth rates of labor and capital inputs are defined as the ratio between the input changes 
and the averages between its past and present values. These definitions follow Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1992), and Davis et al (1996).












































       ( 1 )  
 
 
Before a firm adjusts its factors of production, the employment (capital) shortage at time t can be 
defined as the difference between the desired level of employment (capital) at time t and the 
actual level at time t-1. Paralleling the previously defined growth rates, the shortage rate is 
expressed as a fraction of the average between the present desired level and the past observed 
level. Therefore, employment (blue and white collar respectively) and capital shortages (ZBjt, 
ZWjt, ZKjt) are: 
 
                                                           
1 A feature of these growth rates is that they are bound between –2 and 2. There is a monotonic relation between the 
























































      ( 2 )  
 
 
Following Eslava et al (2005) adjustment functions (ABjt, AWjt, AKjt, for blue and white collar 
employment and capital, respectively) are defined as the fraction of each shortage that is actually 


























        ( 3 )  
 
The next step is to characterize such adjustment functions in terms of the shortages in all three 
factors. It is relevant to consider the case in which the adjustment function in each of them is not 
independent of the shortages observed in the other two. We follow a parametric strategy in which 
we allow capital and labor shortages to depend on their own shortage, on the other factors 
shortages and on interactive terms. In particular, the adjustment functions are not restricted to be 
linear and we allow for different intercept and slope for shortages and surpluses (or negative 
shortages). We do so because the causes of adjustment costs are different in the creation and 
destruction side. For instance, hiring new employees entails search, recruiting and training costs 
while firing current employees is associated with severance payments and eventual effects on the 
moral of the remaining employees. The basic specifications omitting the asymmetric interactions 
for positive shortages are: 
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The significance of the non linear terms would indicate that a firm with a larger gap between 
desired and actual factor levels adjusts more, hence this would be evidence of the presence of 
fixed costs associated with adjustment. These fixed costs cause the adjustment decisions to be 
lumpy. In other words if there is lumpiness in the adjustment process, then the percentage of 
adjustment towards the desired levels for each factor is expected to be increasing in the absolute 
value of the shortage of that factor. 
 
Our policy exercises will be framed in terms of an extended version of equation (5). We focus 
basically on tariff protection and trade reform. The first step is then to estimate pre and post 
Mercosur adjustment functions to detect shifts in the response of firms arising from changes in 
the environment. However, since this does not allow isolating the reform effect from other 
factors also present in the period, we also study the interactions of a set of policy variables with 
the adjustment functions. In our policy experiments we use tariffs, changes in tariffs, and a 
measure of export orientation of firms. 
 
Finally, we find it useful to calculate the output gap attributable to adjustment costs. The output 
gap follows straightforward from the production function and the actual and desired input levels.  
 
3.  Estimation of desired input levels 
 
A technical description of the methodology for the estimation of the desired input levels follows. 
The reader interested mostly in the results of our exercises may skip this section and proceed 
directly to section 4. 
   6
3.1. Frictionless factor levels  
 
To obtain the firm’s desired factor input levels, our procedure starts by estimating the firm’s 
frictionless factor demands, based on prior estimates of plant level productivity and demand 
shocks. Estimating the frictionless input levels allows obtaining in turn the desired input levels. 
Frictionless levels correspond to those levels of inputs that the firm would choose in absence of 
adjustment costs, and are derived from the firm’s optimization problem.  
 
 
The firm’s production function is assumed to be: 
 
() jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt V M E W H B K Y
φ γ μ β α =      (6) 
 
where K is capital, B is blue collar employment, H are blue collar hours, W is white collar 
employment, E is energy, M are materials and V is total factor productivity shock.
2 
 
There is also an inverse demand function for the firm, given by: 
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whereη is the elasticity of demand and D is a time and firm specific demand shock capturing all 
factors other than firms’ own price affecting demand.  
 
Firms face competitive factor markets with the following total costs for blue collar labor, white 
collar labor, capital, energy and material: 
 
( )
jt Mt jt M
jt Et jt E
jt Kt jt K
jt Wt jt W
δ
jt t jt t jt jt B
M P ) (M ω
E P ) (E ω
K P ) (K ω
W P ) (W ω





+ = 1 0 1
     (8) 
 
where PW is the white collar wage, PK is the user cost of capital, PE is the per unit cost of energy 
and PM is the per unit cost of materials. In the case of blue collar employees, total compensation 
is the product of employment Bjt times a wage function that depends on total hours Hjt. This tries 
to capture the fact that the marginal wage is not constant. As the firm tries to increase hours per 
worker, it must resort to overtime hours and a premium must be paid at least for some workers. 
                                                           
2 For simplicity all firms are assumed to have the same production function.    7
This function is indexed by parameters w0 (straight-time blue collar wage), w1 (overtime 
premium) and δ (marginal wage elasticity). 
3 
 
After taking logs, the first order conditions for both types of employment, hours, capital, energy 
and materials yield the following system of equations (where  X  denotes the frictionless levels, 
X ln X
~
=  for variables and  P ln P
~
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3 As in Caballero and Engel (1993), our functional form for the blue collar compensation implies that in the absence 
of employment adjustment costs, the firm would always choose the same number of hours per worker, and adjust to 


















































    (14) 
 
 
In absence of adjustment costs for hours, energy and materials, the frictionless levels of those 
inputs coincide with the observed levels. Therefore, the first order conditions can be reduced to a 
system of three equations and three unknowns. After solving it, we can write the log of the 
frictionless levels of capital, blue-collar employment and white collar employment as functions 
of the parameters of the model to be estimated and observed variables as follows: 
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=      (17) 
 
  
3.2. Desired factor levels and output gap 
 
Frictionless levels are not the same as the desired ones. Both concepts differ in that the desired 
levels are the ones observed if adjustment costs are momentarily removed, while frictionless 
levels are the ones observed in absence of adjustment costs in all periods. Bertola and Caballero 
(1994) state reasonable conditions under which the desired levels can be approximated, up to a 
constant, by frictionless levels.  
















        ( 1 8 )  
 
where  ( ) ( ) ( ) jt jt jt jt jt jt W W B B K K   ,   and    ,   , ,
* * *  are respectively the desired and frictionless levels of 
capital, blue-collar and white collar employment. The firm specific constants to be estimated are 
Bj Kj θ θ   ,  and Wj θ . 
 
Following Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995, 1997)  Wj Bj Kj θ θ θ   and     , can be determined as 
the ratio between the actual and frictionless capital, blue collar and white collar employment, for 
the year where investment and employment growth for each type take their median values 
respectively. It is then implicitly assumed that, in the year of the median employment growth and 
median investment, the desired and the actual adjustment of employment and capital respectively 
coincide.  
 
To define the output gap we make the extra assumption that total factor productivity is an 
exogenous shock not dependent on the levels of the inputs. Given the production function and 
the previous assumption that the desired and actual hours, materials and energy consumption 
coincide, the desired output is:  
 
() jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt V M E W H B K Y
φ γ μ β α * * * * =     (19) 
 
Adding firms’ output and desired output it is straightforward to estimate the output gap.  
 
 
3.3. Estimation of various variables and parameters  
 
 
3.3.1.  Productivity shock estimation 
 
We use Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) methodology to obtain a measure of total factor 
productivity by estimating a production function where an electricity consumption variable is 
used to control for unobservables. Such method specifically controls for two problems in this 
type of estimations: the selection problem (i.e. in a panel a researcher would only observe the 
surviving firms, hence those likely to be the most productive), and the simultaneity problem (the 
input choices of firms conditional on the fact that they continue to be in activity depend on their 
productivity). 
 
Given the production function specification in equation (6) we compute total factor productivity 
as:  
   10








φ γ μ β α − − − + − − =    (20) 
 
where  γ μ β α ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ and φ ˆ  are the estimated factor elasticities for capital, blue collar employment 
hours, white collar employment, electricity and materials respectively, and all variables are 
expressed in logs. The estimated coefficients of the production function are shown in Table 1. 
The null hypothesis of constant returns of scales is not rejected, though is not imposed. The 
standard errors are estimated across 100 bootstrapped samples.  
 
 
3.3.2.  Demand shock estimation 
 
We also estimate establishment level demand shocks based on the inverse demand equation (7). 
The inverse demand function is estimated in logs, and the demand shock recovered as the 
residual.  
 






− = . In order to identify the elasticity of the demand equation we estimate a two 
equation system of demand and supply, using three stage least squares. Supply shifters include 
total factor productivity and a sector wage index, while time and industry effects are also 
included. Results are presented in Table 2. 
 
 
3.3.3.  Input prices and compensation function estimation 
 
Our database has input prices for goods, white collars, materials and energy. They all vary across 
years and four digit sectors. For the user cost of capital we use a constant value of 10%. The only 
parameters remaining to be estimated are those of the compensation function for blue collar 
workers.  
 
The postulated compensation function for blue collars is stated in (8).
4 Bils (1987) and Cooper 
and Willis (2004) estimate for the U.S. the wage marginal elasticity δ to be 2. Eslava et al (2005) 
working with Colombian firms calibrate δ to 2 and w1 to the legally overtime premium and 
estimate from their data the straight-time wage w0. We also calibrate δ to 2 and perform a non 




                                                           
4 It would be desirable to postulate a similar function for white collar workers too, but our database does not include 
information on hours worked by white collars.    11
4.  Adjustment functions and the effects of policy changes in the adjustment process  
 
 
4.1. Estimated adjustment functions 
 
In this section we present our baseline adjustment function estimations. Figures 1 to 3 display the 
histograms of the estimated shortages. Their distributions are roughly symmetric. Table 4 
presents summary statistics on the desired, frictionless and actual input levels. All correlations 
are high suggesting the models predicts reasonably well. For the whole manufacturing sector the 
level of desired white collar jobs is 15% above the actual one and the desired blue collar jobs and 
capital are 10% above the actual ones.  
 
Figure 4 shows the mean and median output gap defined as the ratio between firm’s desired 
output and actual output. The mean output gap for the whole period is 2%.  The gap follows the 
Uruguayan business cycle. In 1982, Uruguay suffered a deep exchange rate and financial crisis 
that led to three years of recession. In such years the desired output was below the observed one. 
In 1985, the economy started to recover but the desired output was still lower than the actual one. 
The next five years are expansion years and firms tend to desire more employment and capital 
than what they actually had implying positive output gaps. Due to inflationary problems the 
government in 1990 undertook contractionary fiscal policies that led to a halt in GDP growth that 
was resumed two years later. This implied the negative gaps in the early nineties and the positive 
ones of the last years of our sample.  
 
Turning now to the adjustment functions themselves, we estimate the parameters in equations (5) 
by panel fixed effects regressions. For each factor separately we generate a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 when the shortage is positive and 0 otherwise. Interacting this dummy with 
the factor shortage and with the cube of the shortage we allow for asymmetric effects of 
shortages and surpluses, i.e. we allow for different levels as well as slopes of the adjustment for 
shortages and surpluses. 
 
The adjustment functions for white and blue collar employment and capital are displayed in 
figure 5. Since our specification implies that every shortage in every factor and the interactions 
between them can potentially have an effect on the adjustment of each factor, we present our 
baseline estimation setting the shortages of other factors at zero. The percentage of the 
adjustment is plotted as a function of the shortage. Negative shortages would indicate that the 
past level of the input is above the desired one (factor surplus), hence to close this gap the firm 
needs to decrease this factor, and it finds itself in the job or capital destruction side. Conversely, 
positive shortages show a past level of the input below the desired one, hence if the firm wants to 
close the gap, it will be in the factor creation side, i.e. it will invest or hire. 
 
Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients of the baseline adjustment functions. The significance 
of the Pos interactions variable shows that the adjustment function in all cases is asymmetric 
with respect to shortages and surpluses, with the exception of capital, where there is a difference 
in the slope only.  
 
Figure 5 also shows that there is an asymmetric behavior in the adjustment process. First, for 
small values of the observed shortage, white and blue collar employment adjustment functions   12
show an upward shift in the positive side. This means that firms tend to adjust a larger fraction of 
the gap between the desired and the actual employment when the observed levels are below the 
desired ones, i.e. firm finds it easier to create labor than to destroy it except when the destructive 
adjustment is large.  
 
Since in most cases the cross product terms that include the adjusting factor are significant, we 
can infer that, as conjectured, shortages of other factors are relevant to understand the adjustment 
process. The negative sign of this cross shortages terms imply that large shortages of one factor 
lead to less responsiveness in adjustment in the creation side of other factors but larger 
adjustment in the destruction side. To observe the effect of the rest of the factors in each 
adjustment function, figures 6 to 8 show separately the adjustment function of each factor, where 
the shortages in the other factors are set at their mean values, and their mean values plus and 
minus one standard deviation respectively.  
 
The lumpiness of the adjustment process is shown by the fact that the size of the adjustment is 
increasing in the absolute value of the shortage observed in almost all cases, both in the creation 
and the destruction side. Our results also confirm nonlinearity of the adjustment process, since 
nonlinear terms are in all tables statistically significant.  
 
Another asymmetry is given by the fact that estimated adjustment functions display a smaller 
slope in the creation side than in the destruction side. The differences in the slopes can be 
understood together with the differences in the intercepts. The higher intercept in the creation 
side indicates higher adjustment for firms with small factor shortages, while a relatively flat 
slope of the adjustment schedule shows that they are able only to undertake smaller adjustments 
when there is a high positive shortage. On the contrary, the lower adjustments for small surpluses 
are associated with firms closing higher percentages of the gaps when surpluses become large 
enough in absolute values. A natural interpretation of this result is that there are larger 
adjustment costs associated to factor destruction (severance payments, loss of specific human 
capital, etc.) than to factor creation  (search, training, etc.).  
 
Comparing the different factor adjustment functions, both in the creation and the destruction 
side, the slopes for white collar are larger than for blue collar labor. Such features can be seen as 
related to the differences in adjustment costs for each factor. Labor unions tend to be stronger in 
industries more intensive in blue collar labor; hence this can be related to lower adjustment 
levels when shortages are large in the destruction side. The white collar adjustment function has 
higher slope than blue collar adjustment on both sides. When the shortage is small in absolute 
value, adjustment is lower in white collar than in blue collar. Conversely, if the shortage is large 
in absolute value, a larger proportion of the gap is closed for white collars than for blue collars.  
 
 
Probably this relates to the fact that white collar labor includes workers with specific human 
capital, which is difficult to create. Therefore firms probably may be willing to accept small 
shortages without adjusting, but the adjustment will be fuller when the shortage becomes large in 
absolute value. For instance, consider a firm that has more clerks that needed, but these clerks 
are familiar with the workings of the firm: if this shortage is not too large, the firm may prefer to 
keep these extra workers. On the other hand, if blue collars have less specific training, they may   13
be more easily disposed. On the creation side, hiring an extra clerk implies higher training costs; 
hence the firm may prefer to use the existent workers more intensively if the shortage is small. If 
the shortage becomes large enough, the cost of the extra hours will be higher than the training 
cost of the newly hired white collar workers. 
 
Finally, the effects of the shortage of the other factors in the adjustment function are captured 
both by the direct effect and the cross product effects terms, but their impact comes mostly from 
the latter. A negative sign of the coefficients of the cross product of the shortages (see Table 5) 
causes that the higher the shortages of the other factors, the higher the adjustment in the 
destruction side, and the lower the adjustment in the creation side (see figures 6 to 8). Many 
firms downsized and even exited over the period of trade liberalization. This implied the 
simultaneous destruction of labor (both white and blue collar) and capital. This explains why 
higher shortages in absolute value for capital (white collar employment) provoke higher 
adjustment on white collar (capital). According to the evidence presented in Casacuberta, 
Fachola and Gandelman (2004), firms in order to remain competitive switched towards more 
capital intensive production methods. Therefore, the lower the shortage in capital (employment), 
the higher the adjustment in employment (capital). 
 
4.2. Trade reform effects in the adjustment process of firms 
 
Vaillant (2000) describes the trade liberalization process in Uruguay, finding that trade policy in 
the nineties sought to continue and deepen the openness process started in the seventies, intended 
to end the anti-export bias that characterized previous import substitution policies. With the 
recovery of democratic institutions in 1985, political pressure for the modification of trade policy 
grew, but the government did not modify the main policies, and there was only a slightly higher 
protection as a result of the use of non-tariff barriers. In 1990, a program of scheduled tariff 
reductions began, and the signature of the Mercosur treaty led to the establishment of an 
imperfect customs union with its neighboring countries.  
 
To study the impact of trade liberalization and international exposure on the adjustment process 
we estimate several adjustment functions. We are looking at the way sectoral shocks (protection 
level, trade liberalization) affect the way firms respond to idiosyncratic shortages. Industries that 
were more open from the beginning should experience lower shifts in their adjustment functions 
due to the generalized higher international exposure.  
 
A problem with using tariffs or change in tariffs in the right hand side of equations is that they 
may possibly be endogenous. In our case this problem is less severe due to the fact that Uruguay 
is a relatively minor player integrated with its larger neighbor economies in Mercosur. Hence the 
common external tariff and the changes in Uruguayan tariffs to converge to the trade block 
protection level are basically affected by Argentinean and Brazilian political players and beyond 
control for local firms.
5 
 
Descriptive statistics of our policy and firm variables are presented in Table 6. We find that the 
average tariff was reduced significantly from an average of 43% to 14% between 1985 and 1995. 
On average, annual tariff changes accelerated from –2.1% before 1990 to –3.0% after 1990.  
                                                           
5 This is discussed in more detail in Casacuberta, Fachola and Gandelman (2004)   14
 
The average ratio of exports over sales did not change drastically over the years. The start of the 
1990 decade is associated not only with trade openness, but also with a significant appreciation 
of the peso, linked to an exchange rate based anti-inflation policy, which caused a deterioration 
of relative prices that affected exporting firms.  Towards the end of our sample period (1995) 
only a slight recovery of the ratio of exports to total sales is observed. 
 
 
4.3. Before and after 1990 
 
The simplest experiment is to break the panel in two periods, 1982-1989 and 1990-1995, and 
estimate the adjustment functions in each one of them. In the second period was when most of 
the import tariff reductions took place and the Mercosur was established.  
 
To analyze the pre and post Mercosur shifts in the adjustment functions, we interact the intercept 
and each factor’s own shortage terms (allowing for asymmetric effects in the creation and 
destruction sides) in the adjustment equations with a time dummy that takes the value 1 for 
observations in 1990–1995 and 0 elsewhere. Table 7 displays the estimated pre and post 1990 
adjustment functions. In turn, figures 9, 10 and 11 show respectively the pre and post adjustment 
function estimations for each of the three factors we are analyzing. 
 
The results lead to conclude that there was effectively a shift in the adjustment functions between 
both periods. A clear pattern emerges in the creation side for the three factors of production: the 
level increases while the slope remains roughly constant. This implies that firms adjust a higher 
fraction of their shortages suggesting lower adjustment costs at least for the creation side.  
 
The blue collar adjustment pattern differs before and after 1990. While for the whole period 
adjustment functions (figure 5) the intercept is higher in the creation side, the pre Mercosur 
function (figure 10) shows the opposite: a larger fraction of the gap is closed in the destruction 
side than in the creation side. The post Mercosur function shows a much higher fraction of the 
gap closed when shortages are positive. Though there is a very small fraction of adjustment when 
surpluses are small in absolute value, the negative side of the adjustment function becomes 
steeper after Mercosur. 
 
For white collar labor, there is basically no effect on the destruction side. In the case of capital 




4.4. Changes in import taxes 
 
We also estimate adjustment functions to study the effect of changes in tariffs with our shortage 
terms. Again a policy variable is interacted with each factor’s own shortage effect on the 
adjustment functions. Table 8 displays the estimated coefficients. In all regressions at least one 
policy interaction is significant. Figures 12, 13 and 14 show the estimated functions for tariff 
reductions of 0, 2 and 4 percentage points.   15
 
While for capital the impact of tariff reductions is really minor, a pattern emerges for both types 
of labor, in which the fraction of the gap actually adjusted decreases in the creation side, while 
increases in the destruction side. Firms in sectors that experienced higher tariff reductions and 
had to destroy employment adjusted a larger proportion than those not so exposed. On the 
creation side it was the opposite: firms with lower tariff reductions adjusted a larger proportion 
of their shortages. 
 
 
4.5. Tariff trade barrier levels 
 
This exercise is similar to the previous experiment, but instead of using the import tax change in 
the firm’s sector as a shifter of the adjustment functions, we use the import tax level. Table 9 
shows the regression coefficients. Most policy interaction terms are statistically significant for 
blue collar and capital. For white collar only the constant shifter for the creation side changes 
significantly. Figures 15, 16 and 17 display the estimated functions for tariff levels of 10, 20 and 
30 percent points. 
 
Lower tariff levels are associated to higher adjustment on the creation side, especially for blue 
collar jobs but also for white collar jobs and capital. The destruction side seems not to change 
with tariff levels in the case of white collar adjustment functions. For capital and blue collar 
labor, higher tariff levels are associated with lower adjustments in the destruction side, the 
opposite than the creation side. 
 
This is an indirect way of showing that protection may in fact destroy jobs, rather than create. If 
shocks to firm are iid, our result implies that protection will lead to lower levels of employment. 
The reason may have to do with firms’ expectations. For instance suppose there is a generalized 
positive demand shock. A firm in a highly protected sector will not adjust completely in the 
presence of adjustment costs (e.g., firing workers) unless the government has credibly committed 
to maintain protection. If there is any risk that the tariff will go down, then the firm may be more 
reluctant to hire many workers than a similar firm in other sector that is not exposed to the risk of 
the government reducing tariffs. The same applies on the job destruction side. A highly protected 
firm that suffers a negative shock will be more likely to fire workers if the government’s tariff is 
not a credible permanent policy.  
 
 
4.6. Export market orientation 
 
Uruguay’s industrial structure was in the mid eighties basically composed by a reduced number 
of traditional products exporting firms and by sectors developed under the imports substitution 
process. We estimate how the adjustment functions of the firm are affected if they are more 
export or domestic market oriented, as measured by the percentage share of export sales in the 
firm’s total sales.  
 
To do so we interact the percentage of exports over sales variable with each factor’s own 
shortage on the adjustment functions. Table 10 shows the estimated coefficients, while figures 
18, 19 and 20 show the shifts in the estimated functions for export shares of 0%, 25% and 50%.   16
 
In those more export oriented firms the percentage of adjustment is larger both in the creation 
and destruction sides for blue collar labor, implying lower adjustment costs. Firms more export 
oriented, when their desired blue collar employment level is below the actual one, they adjust a 
higher share of the gap than firms oriented to the domestic market. The causality may go in the 
opposite direction. In order to be able to export, firms need to be more efficient, and therefore 
need to have more ability to adjust factor inputs.  
 
There does not seem to be a clear significant pattern between export oriented and domestic 
market oriented firms with respect to capital and white collar adjustment functions.  
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
This paper intends to use micro data to improve our understanding of the effects of policy 
measures on the adjustment of factors of production. On the one hand, the paper finds evidence 
supporting a number of regularities that the previous literature on adjustment functions has 
highlighted. 
 
Our investigation confirms that aggregate investment and job creation might be seen as the result 
of lumpy and discontinuous microeconomic decisions. Individual adjustment constraints depart 
significantly from the constraints implicit in the quadratic adjustment cost model. There are 
several sources of irreversibilities (technological, market-induced, increasing returns in the 
adjustment technology). The evidence provided seems to confirm a pattern that has important 
nonlinear features, hence consistent with such constraints. This impacts the use of all factors of 
production, particularly employment.  
 
The existence of adjustment costs implies that the desired levels of white and blue collar 
employment and capital often deviate from the observed ones. In our data these deviations imply 
that the yearly gaps might be above 10%. To have an idea of the importance of the adjustment 
costs, it is useful to consider that for the whole period the average output gap is of 2%.  
 
On the other hand, the paper intended to assess the effects of protection and trade liberalization 
on firms’ adjustment process. The constraints arising from the adjustment cost functions may 
become an important part of the policy analysis. Our results point to a significant shift in the 
adjustment functions for all the production factors before and after 1990, corresponding with 
significant changes in the trade openness process. The shifts point towards larger fractions of the 
gaps closed in the creation side, and lower in the destruction side. 
 
Trade policy as measured by tariffs levels and their reductions also proved to significantly shift 
the adjustment functions. Firms in less protected sectors have shown higher adjustment fractions 
in the creation side and lower in the destruction side, particularly for blue collar labor. Sectors 
facing larger tariff changes, adjust less in the creation side, particularly for blue collars, and more 
on the destruction side. In the context of tariff reductions of Mercosur, those sectors more highly 
protected were probably those that faced the largest tariff reductions. 
   17
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7.  Appendix: Data 
 
In this paper we exploit Uruguayan establishment level data covering a considerably long period 
of time. We use annual establishment level observations from the Manufacturing Survey 
conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) for the period 1982-1995. The survey-
sampling frame encompasses all Uruguayan manufacturing establishments with five or more 
employees.  
 
The INE divided each four digit International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) sector in 
two groups. All establishments with more than 100 employees were included in the survey; the 
random sampling process of firms with less than 100 employees satisfies the criterion that the 
total employment of all the selected establishments must account at least for 60% of the total 
employment of the sector according to the economic Census (1978 or 1988).  
 
The data for the whole period are actually obtained from two sub sample sets: from 1982 until 
1988 and from 1988 until 1995. In 1988 the Second National Economic Census was conducted. 
After that, the INE made a major methodological revision to the manufacturing survey and 
changed the sample of establishments. The statistical analysis was also performed controlling for 
the sample of origin. Firms entering the sample in 1988 behave similarly than firms from the old 
sample. Differences in behavior in white collar and capital adjustment are small. For the firms in 
the new sample the slope of the blue collar adjustment function is higher in the creation side 
while lower in the destruction side. It is hard to evaluate differences by sample in the sign or size 
of the policy impacts.  
 
In total, we have 627 different establishments present in at least one period. There are 208 
starting in 1982, of which just 185 make it to 1995. The 1988 sample, is composed of 304 
establishments included for the first time in that year, and 254 from the old sample not all of 





To construct the establishment capital stock series, we follow a methodology close to Black and 
Lynch (1997). The 1988 Census reports information on the capital stock. We use machinery 
capital. We avoid overestimation of the amount of depreciation by calculating an average 
depreciation rate by industrial sector and year. The resulting depreciation rate is then used for all 
firms within each sector yearly. We further exclude the value of assets sold in our measure of 
capital, assuming assets have been totally depreciated at that point. Thus, the equation for 
estimating the capital stock for years later than 1988 is: 
 
1 1 − − − + = jit it jit jit jit K I K K δ       ( 2 2 )  
with 











δ          ( 2 3 )  
 
where j indexes firms; i the industrial sector, t the year. K is the capital stock; I is amount 
invested; δ is the depreciation rate; and D is depreciation in pesos.  
 
For years before 1988, the equation is reversed and each year’s capital is obtained by subtracting 
each year’s investment and applying a depreciation factor. The depreciation rate before 1988 was 
not available and was estimated using 1988 data. We ran a simple OLS model for the log of total 
depreciation conditional on the log of gross output, capital stock, total hours and electricity 






















We use data on import tariffs for the period 1985-1995 from Vaillant (2000) and Casacuberta, 
Fachola and Gandelman (2004). 
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8.  Tables 
 
 
Table 1   
Levinsohn-Petrin productivity estimation 
   
  Coefficients   Std. Err. 
  
White collar  0,148***  0,026 
Blue collar hours  0,234***  0,036 
Materials 0,314***  0,053 
Machinery capital  0,120*  0,063 
Electricity   0,200***  0,088 
   
Number of observations  5903   
Number of establishments  685   
Wald test of constant returns to scale:  Chi2 =1,51 (p = 0,22) 
Note: Dependent variable is gross output. All variables are in logs 




Demand shock estimation 
Three-stage least squares regression 
 Obs  Parameters 
Demand equation  5903  9 
Supply equation  5903  16 
  
Coef, Std.  Err. 
Demand equation     
Price -1,156*  0,619 
  
Supply equation     
Price 0,863*  0,520 
Total factor productivity 0,006*  0,003 
Wage Index  -0,376**  0,166 
 
Note: Dependent variable is gross output.  
Endogenous variables: gross output and price. 
Exogenous variables not reported: year dummies (supply) and 3 
digit ISIC industry dummies (demand) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   21
 
Table 3 
Compensation function estimation 
Non linear least squares 
 Coefficient  Std.  Err. 
  
w0 0,816***  0,016 
w1 1,24E-07***  6,36E-09 
Delta 2 
 
Number of obs  6198 
R-squared 0.832   
Adj R-squared  0.844   
Note: * Parameter delta taken calibrated to 2. 




Summary statistics: actual, desired and frictionless factor levels 
      
Mean values     
Variable Observations Mean  Std.  Dev. 
DW 5512  37  75 
W 5512  32 63 
DB 5512  115  208 
B 5512  105  168 
DK 5512  275333  788947 
K 5512  249379  657317 
  
Pariwise Correlations:    
 FW  DW  W 
FW   1.00     
DW   0.75  1.00   
W   0.72  0.85  1.00 
      
 FB  DB  B 
FB   1.00     
DB   0.66  1.00   
B   0.65  0.88  1.00 
      
 FK  DK  K 
FK   1.00     
DK   0.66  1.00   
K   0.63  0.82  1.00 
Note: K = actual capital, FK = frictionless capital, DK= desired capital   
Idem with B, FB, DB and W,FW,DK for blue and white collar 
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Table 5 









Constant 0.074 0.166 0.060 
 [0.022]*** [0.023]*** [0.021]*** 
Pos Shortage  0.137 0.1406 0.026 
 [0.039]*** [0.037]*** [0.036] 
(ShortageW)^2 0.189 0.029 0.006 
 [0.011]*** [0.012]** [0.013] 
(ShortageW)^2*Pos -0.103  
 [0.017]***  
(ShortageB)^2 -0.009 0.099 -0.025 
 [0.015] [0.012]*** [0.013]* 
(ShortageB)^2*Pos -0.071  
 [0.019]***  
(ShortageK)^2 -0.012 0.021 0.179 
 [0.011] [0.010]** [0.007]*** 
(ShortageK)^2*Pos -0.137 
 [0.013]*** 
(ShortageW)*(ShortageB) -0.042 0.0011 0.011 
 [0.014]*** [0.013] [0.016] 
(ShortageW)*(ShortageK) -0.025 0.001 -0.001 
 [0.012]** [0.014] [0.012] 
(ShortageB)*(ShortageK) 0.026 -0.058 -0.059 
 [0.016] [0.0121]*** [0.011]*** 
Observations 4945 4945 4945 
Number of id  627 627 627 
R-squared 0.3 0.29 0.37 
Note: Pos Shortage: Dummy=1 if Shortage is positive 
ShortageW. ShortageB. ShortageK are the shortages for white collar. blue 
collar and capital.  Standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6 
Policy and firm variables 
Descriptive statistics 
  tariff (%)  Tariff 
change   Export/sales 
1982 .  .  0.17 
1983 .  .  0.20 
1984 .  .  0.20 
1985 42.53  .  0.19 
1986 38.96  -3.47  0.19 
1987 35.49  -3.46  0.19 
1988 32.64  -3.46  0.14 
1989 32.07  -0.57  0.16 
1990 31.50  -0.57  0.16 
1991 24.59  -6.97  0.15 
1992 20.68  -3.91  0.15 
1993 17.09  -3.54  0.15 
1994 17.11  0.02  0.15 
1995 14.01  -3.14  0.16 
      
All period      
Mean 26.3  -2.8  0.2 
standard dev  9.9  2.7  0.3 
Percentile 50  24.9  -2.9  0.0 
Percentile 90  40.0  0.1  0.8 
Before 1990      
Mean 34.7  -2.1  0.2 
standard dev  8.2  1.8  0.3 
Percentile 50  34.6  -2.2  0.0 
Percentile 90  44.5  0.3  0.8 
1990 and after      
Mean 21.3  -3.0  0.2 
standard dev  6.9  2.9  0.3 
Percentile 50  19.8  -3.1  0.0 
Percentile 90  31.4  0.0  0.7   24
 
Table 7 
Estimated parametric adjustment functions 
Pre and post Mercosur estimation  
 
White collar  
adjustment 




Constant 0.089 0.367 0.071
 [0.027]*** [0.029]*** [0.026]***
Pos Shortage  0.083 -0.180 -0.055
 [0.048]* [0.044]*** [0.042]
(ShortageW)^2 0.174 0.022 0.008
 [0.014]*** [0.012]* [0.012]
(ShortageW)^2*Pos -0.107
 [0.024]***
(ShortageB)^2 -0.005 0.029 -0.020
 [0.014] [0.017]* [0.013]
(ShortageB)^2*Pos 0.012
 [0.023]
(ShortageK)^2 -0.010 0.021 0.191
 [0.011] [0.010]** [0.009]***
(ShortageK)^2*Pos -0.148
  [0.017]***
(ShortageW)*(ShortageB) -0.038 -0.001 0.003
 [0.014]*** [0.013] [0.016]
(ShortageW)*(ShortageK) -0.027 -0.008 -0.009
 [0.012]** [0.014] [0.012]
(ShortageB)*(ShortageK) 0.025 -0.058 -0.048
 [0.016] [0.012]*** [0.011]***
Constant*Mercosur -0.035 -0.307 0.022
 [0.032] [0.031]*** [0.03]
Pos Shortage*Mercosur  0.099 0.487 0.081













Observations 4945 4945 4945
Number of id  627 627 627
R-squared 0.31 0.33 0.38
Note: Pos Shortage: Dummy=1 if Shortage is positive. ShortageW. ShortageB. 
ShortageK are the shortages for white collar. blue collar and capital.  Mercosur is a 
dummy that takes the value 1 for all observations after 1989. Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   25
 
Table 8 
Estimated parametric adjustment functions 
Tariff changes effect estimation 
 
White collar  
adjustment 




Constant 0.026 0.167 0.062
 [0.030] [0.030]*** [0.031]**
Pos Shortage  0.196 0.116 0.038
 [0.050]*** [0.047]** [0.048]
(ShortageW)^2 0.201 0.032 0.006
 [0.015]*** [0.013]** [0.014]
(ShortageW)^2*Pos -0.076
 [0.023]***
(ShortageB)^2 -0.006 0.044 -0.022
 [0.015] [0.018]** [0.016]
(ShortageB)^2*Pos 0.026
 [0.026]
(ShortageK)^2 -0.009 0.033 0.179
 [0.013] [0.012]*** [0.013]***
(ShortageK)^2*Pos -0.119
  [0.020]***
(ShortageW)*(ShortageB) -0.047 -0.002 -0.013
 [0.015]*** [0.013] [0.018]
(ShortageW)*(ShortageK) -0.025 -0.013 0.016
 [0.014]* [0.015] [0.014]
(ShortageB)*(ShortageK) 0.036 -0.040 -0.063
 [0.018]** [0.014]*** [0.013]***
Constant*Open -0.019 -0.002 -0.017
 [0.007]*** [0.006] [0.007]**
Pos Shortage*Open  0.012 -0.007 0.020













Observations 4278 4278 4278
Number of id  627 627 627
R-squared 0.33 0.31 0.31
Note: Pos Shortage: Dummy=1 if Shortage is positive. ShortageW. ShortageB. 
ShortageK are the shortages for white collar. blue collar and capital.  Open is the 
annual change in tariff levels. Standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   26
 
Table 9 
Estimated parametric adjustment functions 








Constant 0.052 -0.181 0.057 
 [0.051] [0.047]*** [0.051] 
Pos Shortage  0.289 0.778 0.192 
 [0.080]*** [0.071]*** [0.074]*** 
(ShortageW)^2 0.207 0.022 0.009 
 [0.028]*** [0.012]* [0.013] 
(ShortageW)^2*Pos -0.136  
 [0.044]***  
(ShortageB)^2 0.002 0.177 -0.022 
 [0.015] [0.031]*** [0.015] 
(ShortageB)^2*Pos -0.083  
 [0.047]*  
(ShortageK)^2 -0.008 0.026 0.119 
 [0.013] [0.011]** [0.024]*** 
(ShortageK)^2*Pos -0.102 
 [0.035]*** 
(ShortageW)*(ShortageB) -0.047 -0.012 -0.007 
 [0.015]*** [0.013] [0.017] 
(ShortageW)*(ShortageK) -0.022 -0.010 0.001 
 [0.013] [0.015] [0.013] 
(ShortageB)*(ShortageK) 0.030 -0.056 -0.052 
 [0.017]* [0.013]*** [0.01193]*** 
Constant*Tariff 0.00074 0.01419 0.002 
 [0.002] [0.002]*** [0.002] 
Pos Shortage*Tariff  -0.006 -0.026 -0.008 
 [0.003]** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
(ShortageW)^2*Tariff -0.001  
 [0.001]  
(ShortageW)^2*Pos*Tariff 0.002  
 [0.002]  
(ShortageB)^2*Tariff -0.003  
 [0.001]***  
(ShortageB)^2*Pos*Tariff 0.002  





Observations 4507 4507 4507 
Number of id  627 627 627 
R-squared 0.32 0.34 0.32 
Note: Pos Shortage: Dummy=1 if Shortage is positive. ShortageW. ShortageB. 
ShortageK are the shortages for white collar. blue collar and capital.  Tariff is 
the sector average import tariff. Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   27
 
Table 10 
Estimated parametric adjustment functions 
Export share in sales effect estimation 
 White Blue Capital 
Constant 0.089 0.169 0.042 
 [0.026]*** [0.026]*** [0.024]* 
Pos Shortage  0.095 0.105 0.073 
 [0.043]** [0.041]** [0.040]* 
(ShortageW)^2 0.179 0.040 0.003 
 [0.012]*** [0.013]*** [0.013] 
(ShortageW)^2*Pos -0.071  
 [0.019]***  
(ShortageB)^2 -0.031 0.096 -0.028 
 [0.014]** [0.014]*** [0.014]** 
(ShortageB)^2*Pos -0.047  
 [0.021]**  
(ShortageK)^2 -0.013 0.014 0.187 
 [0.011] [0.010] [0.008]*** 
(ShortageK)^2*Pos -0.160761 
 [0.015]*** 
(ShortageW)*(ShortageB) -0.024 -0.023 0.018 
 [0.015] [0.013]* [0.017] 
(ShortageW)*(ShortageK) -0.016 0.004 0.004 
 [0.013] [0.015] [0.013] 
(ShortageB)*(ShortageK) 0.023 -0.048 -0.063 
 [0.017] [0.013]*** [0.011]*** 
Constant*ExportS -0.090 -0.005 0.073 
 [0.060] [0.068] [0.063] 
Pos Shortage*ExportS  0.330 0.187 -0.210 
 [0.107]*** [0.111]* [0.100]** 
(ShortageW)^2*ExportS 0.018  
 [0.028]  
(ShortageW)^2*Pos*ExportS -0.190  
 [0.052]***  
(ShortageB)^2*ExportS 0.072  
 [0.044]*  
(ShortageB)^2*Pos*ExportS -0.127  





Observations 4862 4862 4862 
Number of id  618 618 618 
R-squared 0.3 0.3 0.38 
Note: Pos Shortage: Dummy=1 if Shortage is positive. ShortageW. 
ShortageB. ShortageK are the shortages for white collar. blue collar and 
capital.  Exports is the share of firms sales that is exported. Standard errors 
in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   28
 
































































































































Figure 5 - Adjustment functions
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